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ABORTION AND THE PRESIDENTIAL
ELECTION OF 1976: A MULTIVARIATE
ANALYSIS OF VOTING BEHAVIOR
Maris A. Vinovskis*

t

During the 1960s and 1970s, the American public was deeply
split over civil rights, the war on poverty, and Vietnam. Analysts
frequently divided the electorate into new categories such as the
"New Liberals" and the "Silent Majority" as issue-oriented politics polarized the nation. Yet by the mid-1970s, most of the controversies of the previous decade had faded or disappeared entirely. The end of the war in Vietnam, Watergate, increasing
inflation, and domestic energy shortages turned most Americans
inward and away from the larger social debates of the 1960s.
Today, concern about inflation, unemployment, energy, and
foreign policy alternatives has largely replaced the discussion of
new domestic social programs. One possible exception to the lack
of interest in social questions today is the debate over abortion.
As the "pro-life" and "pro-choice" groups continue their battles
within Congress and among the voters, many observers, particularly those in the news media, see abortion as one of the most
divisive and important controversies of the 1970s. 1 In fact, following the widely publicized defeats of prominent pro-choice politicians such as Senator Dick Clark of Iowa and Representative
Donald Fraser of Minnesota in 1978, many analysts are predicting
* Associate Professor, Department of History, University of Michigan; Associate
Research Scientist, Center for Political Studies, Institute for Social Research, University
of Michigan. B.A. 1965, Wesleyan University; M.A. 1966, Ph.D. 1975, Harvard Univer•
sity. - Ed.
t Funds for this project were provided by a fellowship from the Rockefeller Foundation. The analysis and opinions expressed in this paper are, of course, solely my own and
do not reflect in any way the position or the views of the Foundation. I am also indebted
to Sally Brower and Mary Vinovskis for preparing and programming the data.
Portions of this analysis were presented at the annual meeting of the National Abor•
tion Rights Action League in Washington, D.C., February 1978, and at the National Right
to Life Convention in St. Louis, Missouri, July 1978.
1. The choice of words used to describe the opposing sides of the abortion debate is
in itself controversial. For example, the use of the term "pro-life" to designate those who
are against abortions is resented by their opponents because it implies that those who
favor abortions are "anti-life." Rather than taking sides on this matter, I shall use the
terms commonly utilized by each faction for itself. Thus, those groups opposing abortions
will be referred to as "pro-life" while those favoring abortions will be designated as "pro•
choice."
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that abortion will be one of the major factors in federal and state
elections in 1980. As Anthony Lewis of the New York Times recently observed:
Over the last few years political analysts have noted the significance of the single-issue voter: the person who cares only about a
candidate's views on gun control, for example, or busing, or capital
punishment. It is clear now, I think, that one such issue is likely
to have the largest impact on American politics for the longest
time. That is abortion. 2

Despite the widespread public interest in the role of the abortion controversy in American politics today, no one has attempted to analyze systematically its impact on the electorate.=1
Some national opinion surveys have asked voters whether or not
they would be influenced by a candidate's position on abortion,
but they have not attempted to ascertain its relative importance,
compared to other considerations, in the final deliberations of the
electorate. In an effort to provide a more systematic study of the
role of abortion in American politics today, this Article analyzes
the campaign to elect the President of the United States in 1976.
In particular, it studies the coverage of abortion by the news
media, its importance in public opinion polls taken during the
campaign, and its relative impact on voters on November 2, 1976,
using multivariate analysis and survey research data.
J.

ABORTION AND THE PRESIDENTIAL

CAMPAIGN OF

1976

Repeated efforts to liberalize state abortion statutes during
the 1960s culminated in changes in Colorado's restrictive abortion
law in 1967. Seventeen other states followed suit and liberalized
their abortion statutes before January 1973, when the Supreme
Court declared almost all of the existing state laws against abortion unconstitutional. 4 Yet those early efforts to abolish restric2. Cited in Minneapolis Tribune, Nov. 17, 1978, at lOA.
3. The study of population policy in general and of abortion in particular has been
rather limited to date - particularly empirical efforts to analyze popular or legislative
voting behavior. For collections of essays on population policy and abortion, see
POPULATION AND PoLmCS: NEW DIRECTIONS IN PoLmCAL SCIENCE REsEARCH (R. Clinton ed.
1973); POPULATION POLICYMAKING IN THE AMERICAN STATES (1974); REsEARCH IN THE PoLmCS
OF POPULATION (1972); POLITICAL lssUES IN U.S. POPULATION POLICY (1974); ABORTION AND
SOCIAL JUSTICE (1972); ABORTION IN THE SEVENTIES: PROCEEDINGS OF THE WESTERN REGIONAL
CONFERENCE ON ABORTION, DENVER, COLORADO, FEBRUARY 27-29, 1976 (1977); ABORTION:
NEW DIRECTIONS FOR POLICY STUDIES (1977).
4. On the early developments in the efforts to liberalize abortion laws in the United
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tions on abortions also mobilized strong opposition from various
local pro-life groups. On the eve of the Supreme Court decision,
the voters in Michigan overwhelmingly defeated an attempt to
liberalize that state's abortion law. 5 Thus, though a definite trend
toward easing restrictions on abortions developed during the late
1960s and early 1970s, those efforts were encountering increasingly more determined and better organized opposition.
The debate over abortion did not play a very prominent role
in the presidential election of 1972. Although Richard Nixon
raised the topic at several points in the campaign and sent a letter
to Cardinal Terence Cooke of New York supporting the effort to
repeal New York's liberalized abortion law, he did not try to make
it one of his major issues. Other controversies such as the war in
Vietnam captured the headlines and the attention of the electorate and contributed more to Nixon's landslide victory over George
McGovern than their differences over abortion. 6
The Supreme Court decisions in Roe u. Wade 1 and Doe u.
Bolton8 on January 23, 1973, catapulted abortion to front-page
attention. The pro-choice position suddenly became part of the
Constitution. While most pro-choice activists basked in the afterglow of their victory or turned their efforts to other social issues,
the pro-life forces suddenly faced the formidable task of trying to
States, see J. MOHR, ABORTION IN AMERICA: THE ORIGINS AND EvoLtmON OF NATIONAL
POLICY, 1800-1900 (1978); L. LADER, ABORTION (1966); L. LADER, ABORTION Il: MAKING THE
REvoLtmON (1973); P. MARX, THE DEATH PEDDLERS: WAR ON THE UNBORN (1971); Potter,
The Abortion Debate, in THE SURVIVAL EQUATION: MAN, RESOURCES, AND His ENVIRONMENT
91 (1971); P. Leahy, The Anti-Abortion Movement: Testing a Theory of the Rise and Fall
of Social Movements (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Social Science,
Syracuse University 1975); Vinovskis, Jones, & New, Determinants of Legislative Voting
Behavior on Population Policy: An Analysis of the Massachusetts House of Representa•
tives in 1970 and 1971, in POPULATION POLICYMAKING IN THE AMERICAN STATES 239 (1974).
5. Cathy Abernathy of the Department of History at the University of Michigan has
been· doing research on the politics of abortion in Michigan during the referendum cam•
paign in 1972 (unpublished paper, Ann Arbor, Michigan). For an example of a detailed
state analysis of the politics of abortion, see P. STEINHOFF & M. DIAMOND, ABORTION
POLITICS: THE HAWAII EXPERIENCE (1977).
6. On the 1972 election, see Miller, Miller, Raine, & Brown, A Majority Party in
Disarray: Policy Polarization in the 1972 Election, 170 AM. POLITICAL SCI. REV. 753 (1976);
Popkin, Gorman, Phillips, & Smith, Comment: What Have You Done For Me Lately?
Toward an Investment Theory of Voting, 170 AM. POLITICAL Sci. REv. 179 (1976); Steeper
& Teeter, Comment on'~ Majority Party in Disarray," 70 AM. POLITICAL SCI. REV. 806
(1976); RePass, Comment: Political Methodologies in Disarray: Some Alternative Inter•
pretations of the 1972 Election, 17 AM. POLITICAL SCI. REv. 814 (1976); Miller & Miller,
Ideology in the 1972 Election: Myth or Reality-A Rejoinder, 17 AM. POLITICAL SCI. REV.
832 (1976).
7. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
8. 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
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reverse the Court's decision on abortion. Thus, Roe caused a role
reversal that shifted political initiative on the abortion issue from
the pro-choice group to the pro-life camp. The first major test of
the political impact of the Supreme Court decision came in the
congressional elections of 1974. Though some pro-life groups targeted several congressmen whom they regarded as particularly
pro-choice, a candidate's position on abortion proved relatively
unimportant in most races. A detailed survey of the issues in the
contests for the House and Senate during 1974 revealed that in
the vast majority of the electoral contests, abortion was not a
major campaign topic. 9
As the country prepared for the 1976 elections, the abortion
issue received more discussion, and political observers began to
wonder whether the attitudes of American voters toward abortion
had changed as the result of the Supreme Court decision. Frequently, the public shifts its opinion on an issue after the Supreme Court declares it to be either constitutional or unconstitutional; one might have expected such a shift after Roe v. Wade.
To ascertain any shifts in public opinion on abortion between the
1972 and 1976 elections, we used the data from the American
National Election surveys for 1972 and 1976. 10 Since the exact
wording of the questions about abortion can affect the level of
support for or opposition to abortions, comparisons based on different surveys can be very misleading. 11 The comparison between
1972 and 1976, however, should be valid since the same question
was asked in both years. Each respondent in 1972 and 1976 was
shown a page with the following statements:
1. Abortion should never be permitted.
2. Abortion should be permitted only if the life and health
of the woman are in danger.
9. Rosoff, Support of Abortion Political Suicide?, 7 FAM. PLAN. PERSPEC. 13 (1975).
Her findings are confirmed by my investigation of the campaign literature of candidates
for the House, Senate, and state governors for 1974.
10. The data used in this essay were made available by the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research. The data for the CPS 1976 American National
Election Study were originally collected by the Center for Political Studies of the Institute
for Social Research, the University of Michigan, under a grant from the National Science
Foundation. Neither the original collectors of the data nor the Consortium bear any
responsibility for the analysis or interpretations presented here.
11. The influence of the exact wording used in questions about abortion on the level
of support or opposition to abortions has already been extensively documented. For example, see Blake, Abortion and Public Opinion: The 1960-1970 Decade, 171 SCIENCE 540
(1971); Blake, The Abortion Decisions: Judicial Review and Public Opinion, in ABORTION:
NEW DIRECTIONS FOR POLICY STUDIES 51 (1977).
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3.

Abortion should be permitted if, due to personal
reasons, the woman would have difficulty in caring for
the child.
4. Abortion should never be forbidden, since one should
not require a woman to have a child she doesn't want.
7. Other
The results of these surveys indicate that only a small percentage
of the public in both years felt that abortions should never be
permitted or never be forbidden (see figure 1). The great majority
of people agreed that abortions should be permitted, but only
under certain circumstances.
The Supreme Court in Roe held that prior to the end of the
first trimester, the abortion decision and its effectuation must be
left to the medical judgment of the pregnant woman's attending
physician. In the second trimester the state may, if it chooses,
regulate and proscribe abortions, except where it is necessary for
the preservation of the life or health of the mother. In other words,
during the first six months of the pregnancy, the woman is free
to have an abortion for any reason though the state may limit that
choice in the second trimester if it so chooses.
FIGURE 1
ATTITUDE OF AMERICAN VOTERS TOWARD ABORTIONS
IN 1972 AND 1976
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Although the great majority of people agreed with the Supreme
Court's decision to permit abortions (only 11.2% in 1972 and
10.9% in 1976 felt abortions should never be permitted), more
than half of the respondents also answered either that abortions
should be forbidden or that they should only be allowed if the life
and health of the woman are in danger (57.7% in 1972 and 55.6%
in 1976). Thus, while the public accepted the Supreme Court's
liberalization of abortions, it did not agree with the extent of the
freedom the Court granted women to obtain abortions.
Attitudes toward abortion changed very little between 1972
and 1976. Though the percentage of Americans who felt that
abortions should never be forbidden increased from 24.3% in 1972
to 26.6% in 1976 and the proportion who felt it should never be
permitted dropped from 11.2% to 10.9%, that shift is small
enough that it might be simply the result of sampling error rather
than any actual change in attitudes. Since there was apparently
so little change in the attitudes of Americans toward abortions
between 1972 and 1976, and since an overwhelming majority favored abortions if the life or health of the woman were in danger,
one might have expected that abortion would not be a major
campaign topic in 1976 any more than it was in either 1972 or
1974. Yet, at least among some voters, the abortion debates were
among the most divisive of the 1976 campaign, and they even
captured the headlines momentarily. Why?
One reason for the emergence of abortion as a campaign issue
in 1976 was that the pro-life forces launched several organized
efforts to force politicians to take a position on abortion even
though most presidential aspirants would have preferred to avoid
the matter altogether. On November 20, 1975, in a highly unusual
move, the National Council of Catholic Bishops overwhelmingly
adopted a "Pastoral Plan for Pro-Life Activities." The Pastoral
Plan was addressed to "all Church-sponsored or identifiable
Catholic national, regional, diocesan and parochial organizations
and agencies" and called upon them to support a "comprehensive
pro-life legislative program" that included the passage of a constitutional amendment for the protection of the unborn child.
The Bishops' Plan was unique not only for its legislative agenda,
but also for its attempt to organize political support at the local
levels during the 1976 election. The Plan stated:
This effort at persuasion is part of the democratic process, and
is carried on most effectively in the congressional district or state
from which the representative is elected. . . . Thus it is absolutely
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necessary to have in each congressional district an identifiable,
tightly-knit and well organized pro-life unit. This unit can be described as a public interest group or a citizens' lobby. No matter
what it is called:
(a) its task is essentially political, that is, to organize people
to help persuade the elected representatives; and (b) . . . it is
focused on passing a constitutional amendment. 12

Throwing the weight of the National Council of Catholic
Bishops behind the efforts to pass a constitutional amendment to
limit abortions gave the pro-life forces an important boost toward
legitimizing their activities and placing the abortion issue in the
forefront of patential campaign topics for 1976. Furthermore, the
unprecedented and dramatic political conduct of the bishops generated controversy that received additional media coverage. For
example, the liberal National Catholic Reporter issued a highly
critical editorial about the Pastoral Plan:
If the bishops have created a Catholic party, and only time
will tell, they have unleashed a fearsome thing. The Catholic
Church - and its bishops - will have moved into the upper
reaches of national politics as an identifiable political lobby/party
of massive proportions. Such proportions, given the 48 million
Catholic population in this country, could yet rival or counterbalance the largest political parties or lobbies in this country: the
Republican party, the Democratic party, and the AFL-CIO . . . .
The National Conference of Catholic Bishops may have signaled
a major change in th_e makeup of U.S. policies.13

Although no cohesive, national Catholic party or lobby ever
materialized during the 1976 election, the National Conference of
Catholic Bishops did play a prominent role in the election, particularly in the later stages, by raising the question of whether the
normally Democratic Catholic vote would go to Jimmy Carter,
whose position on abortion leaned more toward pro-choice than
that of Gerald Ford. By threatening to tie Catholic support to the
abortion issue rather than to some other problem such as unemployment or housing, the Pastoral Plan helped to push the abortion controversy into the presidential campaign.
While the National Conference of Catholic Bishops sought to
mobilize support for a constitutional amendment against abortions, other pro-life groups coalesced behind the candidacy of
Ellen McCormack in the Democratic primaries. Running as a
12. Cited in Planned Parenthood-World Population Washington Memo, Dec, 15,
1975, at 2 (emphasis original).
13. Cited in id. at 3.
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zealous "right-to-life" advocate, McCormack took advantage of
the new federal matching campaign funds for presidential candidates who were able to raise at least $5000 in twenty states.
Though McCormack's candidacy made little headway among
most voters, her presence in primaries such as New Hampshire
and Massachusetts forced other candidates to deal with abortion.
Few people regarded her as a serious presidential candidate, but
most viewed her campaign as an opportunity to publicize the
movement for a constitutional amendment on abortion. As Jay
Bowman, head of Georgia's Right-to-Life Committee, put it,
"she's not a serious candidate, but she can get equal time [on
television] for the pro-life message and she can get the Federal
government to pay for the ads." 14
In the aftermath of the first presidential primary, the cause
of pro-life groups gained an identifiable target. Jimmy Carter, a
relatively unknown candidate, emerged as the winner of the Democratic primary in Iowa. After his victory, several other Democratic candidates accused him of "waffling" on such issues as
abortion, capital punishment, amnesty for Vietnam war evaders,
and his own political record, an accusation that was to stay with
Carter throughout the campaign. The Iowa primary directed national attention toward abortion because Carter was accused of
deliberately misleading Iowa voters about his stand on abortion.
Indeed, Carter campaigned in Iowa by emphasizing his personal
opposition to abortion. In a statement for the Des Moines diocesan newspaper, the Catholic Mirror, he argued that "no active
government should ever contribute to abortions. We should do all
we can to minimize abortions and to favor a national statute that
would restrict the practice of abortion in our country." 15
Carter's statements were interpreted by many pro-life activists in Iowa as indication of his support for a constitutional
amendment to limit abortions; on this assumption, many of these
activists supported Carter in the primary caucuses. Just a few
days before the primary, however, some Catholic leaders suddenly realized that Carter did not really support a constitutional
amendment. In Sioux City, Monsignor Frank J. Brady announced that, "I was misinformed that Governor Carter favored
a constitutional amendment to reverse the Supreme Court's deci14. Cited in NEWSWEEK, Feb. 9, 1976, at 23.
15. Cited in Planned Parenthood-World Population Washington Memo, Feb. 13,
1976, at 1.
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sion on abortion. " 16 Many people in the pro-life movement felt
that Carter had deliberately misled them in Iowa, and this contributed to their animosity towards him later in the campaign.
Following Carter's unexpected but impressive victory in
Iowa, the news media and the other candidates forced him to
explain his position on abortion. In a statement to Newsweek,
Carter clarified his stand:
I think abortion is wrong. It should not be encouraged by the
government. The government should take a positive role in preventing unwanted pregnancies through education and familyplanning programs. I do not favor a constitutional amendment to
give states local option-authority without knowing the specifics at
this time. I might support a Federal statute minimizing abortions
beyond the first thirteen weeks of pregnancy.'7

Thus, though Carter reiterated his personal opposition to abortion, he did not favor a constitutional amendment prohibiting
abortions. Instead, he tried to leave the door open for some type
of federal statute to limit abortions, but most observers doubted
the constitutionality of any such act.
Carter's difficulties with abortion soon forced other presidential aspirants to state their own positions. On the Democratic
side, Senator Birch Bayh became the candidate most identified
with the pro-choice position. As pro-life groups shifted their attack from Carter to Bayh, Carter was able to direct his attention
to other issues. 18 Though several of the other Democratic candidates, especially George Wallace in the Florida primary, sought
support from the pro-life forces, most observers felt that Ellen
McCormack had cornered most of that support.
On the Republican side, Ronald Reagan pursued and received the support of many pro-life activists by endorsing a constitutional amendment to restrict abortions. 19 Though Reagan
was momentarily embarrassed by the fact that he had signed the
16. Cited in id. at 2.
17. NEWSWEEK, Feb. 2, 1976, at 18.
18. Throughout the primaries, most of the editorial praise or support for presidential
candidates in the pro-life National Right to Life News was either for Ellen McCormack
or Ronald Reagan while Birch Bayh received a disproportionate amount of the criticism.
During the early Democratic primaries, Carter received less scrutiny and attention than
many of the other Democratic contenders.
19. As the Republican convention was about to convene, Ronald Reagan singled out
abortion as one issue on which he planned to challenge Ford before the Republican Platform Committee. New York Times, Aug. 9, 1976, at 12. Rather than trying to make this a
source of major contention between Reagan and himself, Ford's supporters accepted
Reagan's position on abortion in the Republican platform.
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liberalized abortion law in California, he repudiated his earlier
behavior and wholeheartedly embraced the pro-life cause. President Ford, on the other hand, sought to find a middle ground.
Rather than agreeing to a constitutional amendment to restrict
abortions, he favored one to put the entire question back into the
hands of the states. In a CBS television interview with Walter
Cronkite, Ford summarized:
I'm in a moderate position in that area. I do not believe in
abortion on demand. I do not agree with the Supreme Court's
decision in 1973. I do not agree that a constitutional amendment
is the proper remedy. I think we should recognize that there are
instances when abortion should be permitted. Illness of the
mother, rape or other unfortunate things that might happen. So
there has to be some flexibility. I think the Court decision went too
far, I think the constitutional amendment goes too far. If there was
to be some action in this area, it's my judgment that it ought to
be on the basis of what each individual state wishes to do under
the circumstances. Again, I should add that even though I disagree
with the Court's decision, I have taken an oath of office and I will,
of course, uphold the law as interpreted by the Court, but I think
there is a better answer. 20

After Carter's victory in Iowa, the news media began to speculate at great length about the importance of the abortion issue.
For example, in early February Newsweek proclaimed abortion as
"1976's Sleeper Issue" while a New York Times headline claimed
that "Abortion Is Big Issue in Primaries in Massachusetts and
New Hampshire." 21 The results of the New Hampshire and Massachusetts primaries, however, temporarily deflated the importance of abortion in the campaign. Despite the predictions that
Ellen McCormack might do very well in both primaries, she received only about one percent of the vote in New Hampshire and
3.5% in Massachusetts. Even more telling were the results of a
New York Times/CBS poll of Massachusetts Democrats on primary day, which indicated that only seven percent of the Democratic voters thought abortion was an important issue and that
only forty percent of that seven percent cast their ballots for Ellen
McCormack. 22
After the New Hampshire and Massachusetts primaries, the
news media turned their attention away from abortion. Though
20. Cited in Planned Parenthood-World Population Washington Memo, Feb. 13,
1976, at 2.
21. NEWSWEEK, Feb. 9, 1976, at 21; New York Times, Feb. 4, 1976, at 53.
22. New York Times, Mar. 4, 1976, at 18.
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the topic still surfaced from time to time, it did not generate as
much concern from candidates and reporters as it had following
the Iowa primary. Even when the Democratic Convention passed
a resolution against a constitutional amendment and the Republican platform called for an amendment restricting abortions, the
media showed little interest. But while the news media downplayed the abortion issue immediately after the conventions, the
pro-life forces redoubled their efforts. Carter acknowledged that
abortion was the most dis~ussed subject in the letters he received
and that most of the writers felt that the Democratic party platform on abortion was too liberal. 23 Nevertheless, it was only when
the Catholic bishops reentered the picture that the abortion issue
suddenly recaptured the country's attention.
On August 31, Carter met with six Roman Catholic bishops
at the Mayflower Hotel in Washington. He expected to use the
meeting to establish a better working relationship with those
church leaders, and he had been led to believe that the meeting
would permit productive discussion with the Catholic prelates of'
social issues besides abortion. Unfortunately his strategy backfired as Archbishop Joseph L. Bernardin of Cincinnati, President
of the National Conference of Catholic Bishops, refused to discuss
other issues until they resolved the abortion question. As a result,
when Archbishop Bernardin emerged from th.e meeting, he announced that he and his colleagues "continued to be disappointed" with Carter's abortion stance. 24
Although supporters of the pro-life movement were not satisfied with Ford's compromise position and had fought for a Reagan
victory, Ford's post-convention campaign nevertheless benefited
from the movement's negative reactions to Carter. After Ford met
with the six Catholic bishops on September 10, Archbishop Bernardin said the group was "encouraged" though "not totally satisfied" by the President's position on abortion. 25 By their public
comments, the leaders of the National Conference of Catholic
Bishops again stirred the abortion controversy toward the surface
of the campaign stew.
The news media quickly picked up on Carter's difficulties
with the Catholic bishops over abortion. For example, the
23. New York Times, July 25, 1976, at 30.

24. For details on the meeting with the bishops, see M. SCHRAM, RUNNING FOR PRESI·
DENT: A JOURNAL OF THE CARTER CAMPAIGN 250•53 (1977).
25. U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Sept. 20, 1976, at 15-18; NEWSWEEK, Sept. 20, 1976,
at 16-18.
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Newsweek headline on the campaign ran: "On Abortion, the
Bishops v. the Deacon." 26 Speculation was rampant over whether
Carter would be able to hold traditionally Democratic voters
when Ford's position on abortion seemed much more acceptable.
Carter's difficulties with the abortion issue were evident at several campaign stops when pro-life demonstrators heckled him
and prevented him from speaking. 27
In September 1976, just as abortion was being revived as a
major campaign issue, the New York Times and CBS conducted
another survey of the national electorate. Voters were asked, "Do
you favor an amendment to the Constitution which would make
abortions illegal, or do you oppose such a change in the law?"
Contrary to the image projected by the pro-life demonstrations,
the majority of Americans opposed such an amendment (see figure 2): Only 32% of the electorate favored a constitutional amendment to declare abortions illegal, while 58% opposed it. 28 •
FIGURE 2
ATTITUDE OF VOTERS ON AN AMENDMENT TO THE
CONSTITUTION WHICH WOULD MAKE ABORTIONS ILLEGAL,
SEPTEMBER 1976
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26. NEWSWEEK, Sept. 20, 1976, at 11.
27. See U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Sept. 20, 1976, 15-18; NEWSWEEK, Sept. 20,
1976, at 11-12, 16-18.
28. New York Times, Sept. 10, 1976, at 19.
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Even more interesting from the perspective of the presidential campaign, however, was the unexpected discovery that the
controversy over a constitutional amendment was basically nonpartisan (see figure 3). Although 45% of those opposed to an
amendment supported Carter, 47% of those favoring a constitutional amendment also supported him.
FIGURE 3
PRESIDENTIAL PREFERENCES OF VOTERS BY THEIR
POSITION ON A CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT WHICH
WOULD MAKE ABORTIONS ILLEGAL, SEPTEMBER 1976
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Following the survey's release, the abortion controversy once
again subsided as reporters and the news media concluded that
both pro-life and pro-choice activism had relatively little impact
on voters. Despite the continued efforts of the pro-life groups,
abortion never regained the attention and importance that it enjoyed in the media following the Iowa primary and the denunciation of Carter's position by the Catholic bishops.
II.

ABORTION AS A DETERMINANT OF VOTING

BEHAVIOR IN THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION

On November 2, American voters elected Carter by the closest electoral margin in sixty years. Although Carter won 51 % of'
the popular vote to Ford's 48%, the electoral count was so close
that a switch of fewer than 8000 votes in Ohio and Hawaii could
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have given Ford a 270 to 268 victory in the Electoral College. On
the other hand, a shift of only 70,000 votes in eight other states
would have given Carter a sizable 337 to 201 margin.
Given the closeness of the election, it was inevitable that
"Monday-morning quarterbacks" would second-guess the importance of various events and issues in the campaign. Most observers concluded that abortion was not a significant factor in the
election; pro-choice commentators were particularly quick to proclaim that the "election . . . shows abortion not a major issue."w
Because pro-choice forces had not been especially visible or effective during the race, they were content to declare the issue politically unimportant rather than try to claim a major victory from
Carter's election. Moreover, Carter's willingness to place statutory restrictions on abortions prevented pro-choice supporters
from placing too much emphasis on his victory. The pro-life supporters, however, now faced an unhappy predicament: on the one
hand, they wanted to emphasize the importance of abortion in
electoral politics; on the other hand, the candidate they had so
vehemently opposed had just won. John Mackey of the Ad Hoc
Committee in Defense of Life described it:
HAD FORD PULLED IT OFF there is no doubt that abortion
would have been labelled a major factor - it was a big reason for
Carter's amazingly narrow win, and showed in such states as Indiana, New Jersey, and Connecticut. But in politics it's winner-takeall, and Carter's victory is a sharp setback to the anti-abortion
movement (even though it won impressive victories in lesser
races). 30

The issue still remains unresolved: Did the voters' positions
on abortion influence their decisions to vote for Carter or Ford?
The news media and many other observers flip-flopped through
the campaign over whether abortion was a major factor, concluding in the final weeks that it was not particularly important. The
abortion activists were split throughout the campaign - most
pro-choice observers downplayed the political impact of the issue
while their pro-life counterparts emphasized it - even after
Carter's narrow victory.
We can test for the relative importance of the abortion issue
by using the survey data available from the American National
Election Survey on American voting behavior ·from November 2,
1976. Using a preelection questionnaire administered to 2248 re29. Planned Parenthood-World Population Washington Memo, Nov. 12, 1976, at 4.
30. Lifeletter, Nov. 3, 1976, at I.
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spondents and a postelection one that was given to 1909 respondents, that survey offers clues to whether the abortion issue was
an important factor in determining voter behavior. The question
on abortion in that survey is the one we examined earlier - voters
were given four statements on abortion and asked to indicate
their personal preference for one of them.
One might simply cross-tabulate the respondents' answers
about abortion with the way they voted to see whether one's
position on abortion influenced one's vote. In fact, this simple
statistical procedure is the one most commonly employed in the
few efforts to assess the relationship between abortion and voting
behavior. It is inadequate, however, because it does not permit
us to ascertain the relative importance of one's position on abortion, compared to such other factors as one's party identification,
attitude on other issues, or religious orientation. For example, we
may find that pro-choice voters were more apt to support Carter,
not so much because of his specific position on abortion, but
because of his more liberal overall image compared to Ford. Thus,
we need to control for the possible effects of other factors in trying
to determine the role of abortion in the final decision to vote for
Carter or Ford.
Our data set consists of the responses of all persons in the
postelection survey who voted for either Carter or Ford and who
answered the question on abortion. The dependent variable (the
one to be explained) is the vote on the presidency. As independent variables we selected twelve different factors that may have
influenced voters - age, sex, race, marital status, education,
family income, religion, index of liberalism, identification, region
of the country, size of the community, and attitude on abortion.
Though the bulk of our analysis relied upon those independent
variables, we also included in some calculations a series of variables measuring voters' attitudes on other social and economic
issues, to see how well those other factors predicted voting behavior compared to one's position on abortion.
All of the data were analyzed using multiple classification
analysis (MCA). Since many of the readers of this Article may not
be familiar with multiple classification analysis, I will try to provide a brief introduction to this technique. MCA is' a form of
multiple regression analysis with dummy variables. The predictive value of each dummy variable is expressed as an adjusted
deviation from the grand mean (overall average) of the dependent
variable (whom a person votes for). For example, MCA answers
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the question: how much of the vote for Carter is associated with
someone being Catholic, while controlling for such other variables
as the voter's age, sex, and the size of the community. Similarly,
it also provides an approximate answer to the question: Ceteris
paribus, what is the effect of one's religion on whether one votes
for Carter? Multiple classification analysis "controls" for other
variables by assuming that, as it looks at one class of a predictor
variable, the distribution of all other predictor variables will be
the same in that class as in the total population, thus "holding
constant" their effects. Although traditional multiple regression
programs also do this, MCA has three advantages: it does not
require variables to be interval variables, it does not require or
assume linearity and thus can capture discontinuities in the
direction of association, and finally, it is more descriptive because
it calculates the gross effects of a predictor class - the actual
mean of the class - as well as the mean after adjusting for the
influence of other variables. 31
Our analysis reveals that one's position on abortion was not
a good predictor, by itself, of whether one voted for Ford or
Carter. In fact, voters did not divide in any consistent pattern for
Carter or Ford on the basis of their own attitudes on abortion.
While over fifty percent of those who said either that abortions
should never be permitted or that they should never be forbidden
voted for Carter, less than fifty percent of those who qualified
their support for or opposition to abortion supported him (see the
unadjusted percentages in figure 3). Furthermore, the weakness
of attitudes on abortion as a predictor, by itself, of voting behavior is confirmed by the fact that less than one half of one percent
of the variation in voting can be explained by the abortion variable (see eta2 in table A2 in the appendix).
The relationship between attitudes on abortion and voting
behavior became only slightly more consistent after we used
MCA to control for the effects of the other independent variables.
The results - the adjusted percentages in figure 4 - indicate
that taking into account other possible determinants of voting
behavior, voters who favored allowing abortions were more apt to
vote for Carter than for Ford. For example, after controlling for
-31. There are various issues associated with the use of multiple classification analysis
that need to be considered before using this procedure. For an excellent and well-written
introduction to multiple classification analysis, see F. ANDREWS, J. MORGAN, J. SoNQUJST,
& L. KLEM, MULTIPLE CLASSIFICATION ANALYSIS: A REPORT ON A COMPUTER PROGRAM FOR
MULTIPLE REGRESSION USING CATEGORICAL PREDICTORS (2d ed. 1973).
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FIGURE 4
PERCENTAGE VOTING FOR CARTER IN NOVEMBER 1976
BY THEIR POSITION ON ABORTION
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the other factors, only 47.7% of the voters who felt abortions
should never be permitted voted for Carter, while 54.0% of those
who thought abortions should never be forbidden voted for him.
But although controlling for other factors reveals a consistent and
expected relationship, it still does not show abortion to be a major
determinant of voting behavior in 1976. In fact, the voter's attitude on abortion was the weakest of all predictors. 32 The two
strongest predictors were an individual's party identification and
index of liberalism (see the beta weights in table A2). 33
We calculated one final measure of the relative importance
of abortion in 1976. In the postelection portion of the American
National Election Survey, each voter was asked: "What do you
think are the most important problems facing this country?" The
first three responses of each interviewee were recorded. While
32. Since so much attention was focused on whether Carter would be able to maintain
the Catholic vote, it is interesting to observe that 58.1 % of the Catholics supported him
rather than Ford. However, after controlling for the effects of the other variables, Carter
did not receive more support from Catholics than from the rest of the population (see table
Al).

33. For an analysis of the 1976 election and a comparison of the relative importance
of issues in 1972 and 1976, see A. Miller & W. Miller, Partisanship and Performance:
"Rational" Choice in the 1976 Presidential Election (unpublished paper presented at the
American Political Science Association Meeting, Washington D.C., September 1977); W.
MILLER, & T. LEVITAN, LEADERSHIP & CHANGE: PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS FROM 1952 TO 1976
at 189-240 (1976); G. PoMPER, THE ELECTION OF 1976: REPORTS AND INTERPRETATIONS (1977).
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18.9% of all the items mentioned dealt with inflation and 24.2%
with unemployment, less than one tenth of one percent mentioned abortion - once again suggesting that only a very small
minority of the 1976 electorate considered abortion an important
issue.

III.

CONCLUSION

Abortion was never a very important concern of voters during
the 1976 presidential campaign. Yet it managed to capture the
headlines in the weeks after the Iowa primary and in September
after Archbishop Bernardin publicly denounced Carter's stance
on abortion. But by the end of the campaign, even the news
media, which had been eagerly exploiting the abortion issue earlier, acknowledged that it simply was not a major campaign issue.
On November 2, when voters pulled the levers in polling booths
across the country, very few of them decided to vote for either
Ford or Carter on the basis of the candidates' positions on abortion.
The pro-life movement attempted - and failed - to make
a candidate's position on abortion a crucial factor in the election.
Despite their dedication and intense efforts, its supporters were
not able to mobilize the American public - not even those who
basically agreed with them - on behalf of candidates who favored a constitutional amendment to restrict abortions. Yet they
succeeded in temporarily convincing the news media that abortion was a major issue in the campaign. Furthermore, they were
able to force the presidential aspirants to take a position on abortion, typically one that was to some extent critical of the Supreme
Court decision. Thus, although unsuccessful, the pro-life forces
were more active and visible than their pro-choice counterparts
throughout the campaign.
There are several reasons why abortion became a campaign
issue even though most Americans did not perceive it to be a
major national problem. The pro-life movement was very effective in mobilizing volunteers and staging demonstrations. Although these demonstrators were always a small minority of the
electorate, they managed to attract the news media. In addition,
Ellen McCormack's campaign generated considerable publicity
for the pro-life cause even though it ultimately drew few votes.
The Catholic bishops and their Pastoral Plan were also important. By appearing to make their acceptance or rejection of a
presidential aspirant depend almost entirely on the candidate's
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position on abortion, the bishops lent credibility and support to
the pro-life efforts. Fourth, the emergence of fewer major campaign issues in 1976 than in 1972 made it much easier for a relatively unimportant but highly visible issue like abortion to capture public attention. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the
news media were particularly prone to exaggerate the importance
of the abortion issue in American presidential politics. Until the
public opinion polls and the election returns conclusively demonstrated the weakness of abortion as a campaign issue, the news
media were quite willing to depict it as a major factor.
Although it is hazardous to speculate on the role of the abortion issue in future presidential elections, I will venture some
tentative observations based upon this statistical analysis as well
as my assessment of trends in both the pro-life and pro-choice
movements since 1976. It is likely that in 1980 both the pro-choice
and pro-life groups will be much better organized and better financed than in either 1972 or 1976. Furthermore, after some of
the successes of the pro-life effort in the 1978 congressional campaigns, the movement has exhibited an increasing tendency to
participate in electoral politics at all levels. Similarly, the prochoice forces, in large part reacting to the activities of their opponents, seem to be more actively involved in politics. Nevertheless,
there is still no indication whatsoever that the American public
will perceive the abortion issue as any more important in 1980
than in 1972 or 1976. Since the politicians as well as the news
media have now had an opportunity to evaluate the limited impact of abortion on two different presidential campaigns, perhaps
abortion will not have the same high visibility in the news media
and in the presidential campaign efforts in 1980 as in 1976.
On the other hand, although it is likely that abortion will not
play a major role in the presidential campaign of 1980, it probably
will be more important in state and local elections, where the
organized efforts of dedicated activists can be more influential.
Even at the state and local levels, however, most voters probably
will not decide solely because of the candidates' positions on
abortion, yet the presence of pro-choice or pro-life activists will
likely be more effective in these elections than in the presidential
election. Compared with the 1976 results that I have documented
in this Article, I suspect that in 1980 abortion will be much more
of a state and local issue, and much less of a presidential issue.
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APPENDIX
TABLE

Al

PERCENTAGE VOTING FOR CARTER FOR PRESIDENT,
NOVEMBER 2, 1976, CLASS MEANS, ADJUSTED MEANS, NET
DEVIATIONS, AND NUMBER OF CASES
(1 =CARTER/ 0 = FORD)
Class
Mean

Adjusted
Mean

Net
Deviation

Age:
18-29
30-39
40-49
50-59
60-69
70 and Up

51.9
49.3
47.2
54.0
48.9
52.0

47.5
53.5
50.0
52.9
52.8
46.3

-

3.1

-

4.3

267
241
210
223
205
147

Sex:
Male
Female

50.4
50.8

52.0
49.5

+ 1.4
-1.1

569
724

Race:
White
Black
Other

46.5
94.9
63.3

49.3
63.2
59.4

- 1.3
+12.6
+ 8.8

1172
102
19

Marital Status:
Married
Never Married
Divorced or Separated
Widowed

47.7
52.4
62.7
55.1

51.2
48.6
48.1
51.1

-

Education:
8 Grades or Less
9-11 Grades
High School Graduate
Some College
BA or Advanced Degree

65.9
61.8
50.7
47.1
36.8

52.8
50.1
51.0
50.7
48.5

Family Income:
0-$4999
$5000-$9999
$10,000-$14,999
$15,000-$19,999
$20,000-$24,999
$25,000 and Up
No Information

65.0
59.0
50.5
48.9
45.4
29.2
55.4

54.9
52.2
52.0
46.9
49.5
42.7
58.8

+ 2.9
.6
+ 2.3
+ 2.2

+

+

.6
2.0
2.5
.5

+ 2.2
.5
+ .4
+ .1
-

2.1

+ 4.3
+ 1.6
+ 1.4

- 3.7
-1.1
- 7.9
+ 8.2

Number
of Cases

882
130

119
162
170
150
452
276
245
170
243
285
166
169
183
77
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Class
Mean

Adjusted
Mean

Religion:
Presbyterian
Lutheran
Methodist
Baptist
Southern Baptist
Other Protestant
Roman Catholic
Jewish
Other Religion
None or No Preference

35.7
39.7
42.3
50.9
60.2
45.3
58.1
71.3
48.5
68.0

50.8
46.5
49.2
46.8
52.1
51.0
50.6
56.5
48.4
61.7

Index of Liberalism:
Liberal
Slightly Liberal
Moderate
Slightly Conservative
Conservative
Other

84.1
72.6
51.9
26.2
16.5
66.2

Party Identification:
Strong Democrat
Weak Democrat
Independent-Democrat
Independent-Independent
Independent-Republican
Weak Republican
Strong Republican

[Vol. 77:1750
Net
Deviation

Number
of Cases

+
+
+

.2
4.1
1.4
3.8
1.5
.4
0
+ 5.9
- 2.2
+11.1

78
124
149
112
110
297
322
32
14
55

62.9
60.1
52.6
39.3
36.8
56.4

+12.3
+ 9.5
+ 2.0
-11.3
-13.8
+ 5.8

104
124
346
196
213
310

91.2
74.7
75.6
42.0
14.7
21.2
3.3

84.1
71.6
70.8
40.1
21.3
26.0
13.0

+33.5
+21.0
+20.2
-10.5
-29.3
-24.6
-37.6

219
292
145
133
139
201
164

Region of Country:
Northeast
Central
South
West

54.7
47.1
53.4
46.9

53.4
53.2
46.5
49.2

+ 2.8
+ 2.6
- 4.1
-1.4

281
411
382
219

Degree of Urbanization:
Under 2500
2500-9999
10,000-49,999
50,000-349,999
350,000 and Up

51.4
43.7
45.5
53.0
65.5

52.2
49.0
50.1
48.9
52.2

+ 1.6
-1.6
- .5
- 1.7
+ 1.6

408
251
273
214
147

56.0

47.7

-

2.9

127

.4

206

.4
3.4
4.1

206
354
50

Attitude on Abortion:
Never Permitted
Only If Life of Woman
Is in Danger
Permitted for Personal
Reasons
Never Forbidden
Other

49.1

49.6

46.6
53.6
49.2

50.2
54.0
46.5

Total

50.6

+
-

1293
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TABLE A2

PERCENTAGE VOTING FOR CARTER FOR PRESIDENT,
NOVEMBER 2, 1976, ETA2S, BETAS, AND R 2
Eta 2

Beta

Age

0

.0544

Sex

0

.0252

Race

.0686

.0786

Marital Status

.0068

.0230

Education

.0307

.0250

Family Income

.0393

.0850

Religion

.0272

.0627

Index of Liberalism

.1871

.1793

Party Identification

.4103

.5307

Region of Country

.0026

.0604

Degree of Urbanization

.0137

.0295

Attitude on Abortion

.0005

.0020

R2 = .4421

Note: The Eta 2 s and R2 have been adjusted
for the degrees of freedom.

